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Proposals for safe AGI systems are typically made at the level of frameworks, specifying how the components of
the proposed system should be trained and interact with each other. In this paper, we model and compare the
most promising AGI safety frameworks using causal influence diagrams. The diagrams show the optimization
objective and causal assumptions of the framework. The unified representation permits easy comparison of
frameworks and their assumptions. We hope that the diagrams will serve as an accessible and visual introduc-
tion to the main AGI safety frameworks.
1. Introduction
One of the primary goals of AI research is the development of artificial agents that can exceed human
performance on a wide range of cognitive tasks, in other words, artificial general intelligence (AGI). Although
the development of AGI has many potential benefits, there are also many safety concerns that have been
raised in the literature [Bostrom, 2014; Everitt et al., 2018; Amodei et al., 2016]. Various approaches for
addressing AGI safety have been proposed [Leike et al., 2018; Christiano et al., 2018; Irving et al., 2018;
Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016; Everitt, 2018], often presented as a modification of the reinforcement learning
(RL) framework, or a new framework altogether.
Understanding and comparing different frameworks for AGI safety can be difficult because they build on
differing concepts and assumptions. For example, both reward modeling [Leike et al., 2018] and cooperative
inverse RL [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016] are frameworks for making an agent learn the preferences of a
human user, but what are the key differences between them? In this paper, we show that causal influence
diagrams (CIDs) [Koller and Milch, 2003; Howard and Matheson, 1984] offer a unified way of clearly
representing the most prominent frameworks discussed in the AGI safety literature. In addition to surfacing
many background assumptions, the unified representation enables easy comparison of different frameworks.
What makes this unified representation possible is the high information density of CIDs. A CID describes
safety frameworks with random variables that together specify what is under an agent’s control, what the agent
is trying to achieve by selecting outcomes under its control, and what information the agent has available
when making these decisions. Multi-agent CIDs can model the interaction of multiple agents. CIDs also
encode the causal structure of the environment, specifying which variables causally influence which others.
This causal information reveals much about agents’ abilities and incentives to influence their environment
[Everitt et al., 2019].
In our terminology, a framework is a way of building or training an AI system, or a way of situating the
system in an environment so that it learns or achieves some goal. We take a high-level view on what counts as
a framework, so we can talk about different approaches to building safe AGI. Frameworks determine what
agents know and want, insofar as we can take the intentional stance towards them. We focus on frameworks
rather than on implementations of specific algorithms in order to generalize across different safety problems
and draw broad lessons. A safety framework is a framework designed to highlight or address some problem in
AGI safety.
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Modeling AGI Safety Frameworks with Causal Influence Diagrams
The actual behaviour of artificial agents will be contingent on implementation details such as the training
algorithms used or the task specification. But these details can obscure general patterns of behaviour shown
by intelligent systems within a particular framework. By focusing on frameworks, such as reinforcement
learning (RL) or RL with reward modeling, we can characterize the behaviour to be expected from increasingly
intelligent agents (and highlight any safety concerns). Modeling frameworks with CIDs enables analysis of
high-level concerns such as agent incentives before getting into the details of training within a framework.
We describe the framework models in Sections 2 and 3. The descriptions of the frameworks are necessarily
brief; we refer the reader to the original papers for more detailed descriptions. In Section 4 we discuss modeling
choices and interpretations.
2. MDP-Based Frameworks
In this section, we look at frameworks based on Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), which covers several of
the safety frameworks in the literature. Afterwards (Section 3), we look at frameworks based on question-
answering systems, covering most of the other frameworks so far proposed.
2.1. RL in an MDP
Our basic example of a framework is standard reinforcement learning (RL) in a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) [Sutton and Barto, 2018]. This framework is not intended to address any particular safety concerns. It
is, however, the foundation for most present-day development of artificial agents, and will serve as a familiar
skeleton on which many of our models of other frameworks will be based.
R1
S1
A1 R2
S2
A2 R3
S3
Figure 1 | RL in an MDP
Figure 1 models an MDP with a CID. A CID is a causal graph or Bayesian network [Pearl, 2009] with
special decision and utility nodes. Decision nodes are drawn as squares, and utility nodes as diamonds. Edges
represent causal influence, except for those going into decision nodes. The latter are called information links,
and drawn with dotted lines. The agent’s decision for a particular decision node A can only be based on the
parents of the decision nodes, i.e., on the nodes that have information links to A. For example, in Figure 1,
the choice of an action can only depend on the current state.
For this foundational example, we explain the random variables in detail. The MDP modelled in Figure 1
has transition function T (s, a) giving a distribution over next states after taking action a in state s, and reward
function R(s) giving the reward obtained for entering state s. The random variables in the model are:
• Si: the environment state at timestep i. S1 is drawn from the initial state distribution, and Si+1 is drawn
according to T (Si, Ai).
• Ai: the agent action at timestep i.
• Ri: the reward for timestep i, drawn from R(Si).
The CID has a repeating pattern in the relationships between the variables, if we abstract over the timestep
index i. We show 3 timesteps to make the pattern obvious, but this is an arbitrary choice: we intend to
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represent trajectories over any number of timesteps. Formally, this can be done by extending the diagram with
more variables in the obvious way.
Figure 1 represents a known MDP, where the transition and reward probability functions (T and R) are
known to the agent. In this case, an optimal policy only needs access to the current state, as the Markov
property of the MDP makes the past irrelevant. For this reason, we have chosen not to include information
links from past states and rewards, though adding them would also constitute a fair representation of an MDP.
To model an unknown MDP, we add additional parameters ΘT and ΘR to the transition and reward
functions, which hold what is unknown about these functions. Thus, for example, Ri is now drawn from
R(Si ; Θ
R). We extend the CID with additional variables for these unknown parameters, as shown in Figure 2.
Now information links from previous rewards and actions are essential, as past states and rewards provide
valuable information about the transition and reward function parameters.
R1
S1
A1 R2
S2
A2 R3
S3
ΘT
ΘR
Figure 2 | RL in an Unknown MDP
To model a partially observed MDP, we add new variables Oi representing the agent’s observations and
remove the information links from the states, as shown in Figure 3. Information links from past rewards
and observations are included because they provide information about the unobserved states even when the
transition and reward functions are known. A POMDP with unknown parameters can be modeled explicitly
with a similar transformation as from Figure 1 to Figure 2, but it is simpler to use the same diagram as Figure 3
and let the unobserved state variables Si hold the unobserved parameters ΘT and ΘR.
S1
R1 O1 A1
S2
R2 O2 A2
S3
R3
Figure 3 | RL in a POMDP
2.2. Current-RF Optimization
In the basic MDP from Figure 1, the reward parameter ΘR is assumed to be unchanging. In reality, this
assumption may fail because the reward function is computed by some physical system that is a modifiable
part of the state of the world. Figure 4 shows how we can modify the CID to remove the assumption that the
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reward function is unchanging, by adding random variables ΘRi representing the reward parameter at each
time step.
R1
S1
A1
ΘR1
R2
S2
A2
ΘR2
R3
S3
ΘR3
Figure 4 | RL in an MDP with a Modifiable Reward Function
R1
S1
A1
ΘR1
R2
S2
A2
ΘR2
R3
S3
ΘR3
Figure 5 | Current-RF Optimization
Now at each time step i, the agent receives reward Ri = R(Si ; ΘRi ). This gives an incentive for the agent
to obtain more reward by influencing the reward function rather than optimizing the state, sometimes called
wireheading. An elegant solution to this problem is to use model-based agents that simulate the state sequence
likely to result from different policies, and evaluate those state sequences according to the current or initial
reward function [Everitt, 2018; Orseau and Ring, 2011; Hibbard, 2012; Schmidhuber, 2007; Everitt et al.,
2016]. In contrast to RL in an unknown MDP, this is most easily implemented when the agent knows the
reward function parameter. The resulting CID is shown in Figure 5.
2.3. Reward Modeling
A key challenge when scaling RL to environments beyond board games or computer games is that it is hard to
define good reward functions. Reward Modeling [Leike et al., 2018] is a safety framework in which the agent
learns a reward model from human feedback while interacting with the environment. The feedback could be
in the form of preferences, demonstrations, real-valued rewards, or reward sketches.
We represent the feedback data using new variables Di which are used to train a reward model M . Thus,
the reward at timestep i is given by Ri = M(Si | D1, . . . , Di−1). The feedback is produced based on past
trajectories and unobserved human preferences ΘH by some data-generation process G. Thus, the feedback
data at timestep i is given by Di = G(S1, A1, . . . , Si, Ai ; ΘH).
The CID in Figure 6 is a variation of the basic MDP diagram of Figure 1, where variables Di and ΘH are
added for the training of the reward model. A parameter ΘT can be added to model an unknown transition
function as in Figure 2.
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R1
S1
A1 R2
S2
A2 R3
S3
D1 D2
ΘH
Figure 6 | Reward Modeling
Reward modeling can also be done recursively, using previously trained agents to help with the training of
more powerful agents [Leike et al., 2018]. In this case, the previously trained agents can be considered to be
part of the data generation process G, so are captured by the Di variables.
2.4. CIRL
Another way for agents to learn the reward function while interacting with the environment is Cooperative
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL) [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016]. Here the agent and the human inhabit
a joint environment. The human and the agent jointly optimize the sum of rewards, but only the human knows
what the rewards are. The agent has to infer the rewards by looking at the human’s actions. We represent this
by adding two kinds of variable to the basic MDP diagram from Figure 1: the human’s action AHi at timestep
i, and a parameter ΘH controlling the reward function (known to the human but unknown to the agent). The
resulting CID is shown in Figure 7.
R1
S1
A1 R2
S2
A2 R3
S3
AH1 A
H
2
ΘH
Figure 7 | CIRL. The human’s actions are in green and the agent’s in blue; both try to optimize the yellow
rewards.
CIRL is closely related to reward modeling (Figure 6), if we read the human actions AHi as the human data
Di. However, the edges are not the same: in CIRL the human’s actions are observed by the agent and affect
the next state, whereas in reward modeling the feedback data affects the rewards. Likewise, the CIRL diagram
has edges directly from ΘH to Ri, since the rewards are produced by the true reward function rather than a
reward model. In reward modeling, the path from from ΘH to Ri is mediated by Di. Another difference is
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that in CIRL, the rewards are never shown to the agent, which may remain uncertain about how much reward
it generated even at the very end of the episode.
In principle, information links from past rewards to the human’s action nodes AHi could be added to
Figure 7, but they are unnecessary since the human knows the reward parameter ΘH. Unlike the current-RF
optimization setup (Figure 5), the reward parameter is not observed by the agent.
3. Question-Answering Systems
Outside of the MDP-based frameworks, a common way to use machine learning systems is to train them to
answer questions. Supervised learning fits in this question-answering framework. For example, in image
recognition, the question is an image, and the answer is a label for the image such as a description of the main
object depicted. Other applications that fit this paradigm include machine translation, speech synthesis, and
calculation of mortgage default probabilities. In this section we consider safety frameworks that fit in the
question-answering (QA system) paradigm.
A literal interpretation of a QA-system is a system to which the user submits a query about the future and
receives an answer in plain text. Such a system can help a trader predict stock prices, help a doctor make a
diagnosis, or help a politician choose the right policy against climate change. QA-systems have some safety
advantages over the MDP-based systems described in Section 2, as they do not directly affect the world and
do not engage in long-term planning.
3.1. Supervised Learning
In supervised learning, the question corresponds to the input and the state corresponds to the output label.
Since the training labels are generated independently, they are not affected by the agent’s actions. Once the
system is deployed, it keeps acting as if its answer does not affect the label at deployment, whether or not
it does. Theorem proving is another application where this structure holds: a proposed proof for a theorem
can be automatically checked. The setup is shown Figure 8. It is sometimes called Tool AI [Bostrom, 2014;
Branwen, 2016]. So called Act-based agents share the same causal structure [Christiano, 2015].
Question
Answer State
Reward
Figure 8 | Supervised Learning
3.2. Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
The assumption that the labels are generated independently of the agent’s answer sometimes fails to hold. For
example, the label for an online stock price prediction system could be produced after trades have been made
based on its prediction. In this case, the QA-system has an incentive to make self-fulfilling prophecies. For
example, it may predict that the stock will have zero value in a week. If sufficiently trusted, this prediction
may lead the company behind the stock to quickly go bankrupt. Since the answer turned out to be accurate,
the QA-system would get full reward. This problematic incentive is represented in the diagram in Figure 9,
where we can see that the QA-system has both incentive and ability to affect the world state with its answer
[Everitt et al., 2019].
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Question
Answer State
Reward
Figure 9 | Supervised Learning with Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
3.3. Counterfactual Oracles
It is possible to fix the incentive for making self-fulfilling prophecies while retaining the possibility to ask
questions where the correctness of the answer depends on the resulting state. Counterfactual oracles optimize
reward in the counterfactual world where no one reads the answer [Armstrong, 2017]. This solution can be
represented with a twin network [Balke and Pearl, 1994] influence diagram, as shown in Figure 10. Here,
we can see that the QA-system’s incentive to influence the (actual) world state has vanished, since the actual
world state does not influence the QA-system’s reward; thereby the incentive to make self-fulfilling prophecies
also vanishes. We expect this type of solution to be applicable to incentive problems in many other contexts as
well. A concrete training procedure for counterfactual oracles can also be represented with influence diagrams
[Everitt et al., 2019, Section 4.4].
Question
Answer State
Reward
Answer
hidden
Counter-
factual
state
Figure 10 | Counterfactual Oracle. Dashed nodes represent counterfactual variables.
3.4. Debate
The QA-systems discussed so far all require that it is possible to check whether the agent’s answer was correct
or not. However, this can be difficult in some important applications. For example, we may wish to ask the
system about the best way to solve climate change if we want a healthy climate on earth 100 years from now.
In principle we could follow the system’s suggestion for 100 years, and see whether the answer was right.
However, in practice waiting 100 years before rewarding the system or not is slow (too slow for training the
system, perhaps), and the cost of following bad advice would be substantial.
To fix this, Irving et al. [2018] suggest pitting two QA-systems against each other in a debate about the
best course of action. The systems both make their own proposals, and can subsequently make arguments
about why their own suggestion is better than their opponent’s. The system who manages to convince the
user gets rewarded; the other system does not. While there is no guarantee that the winning answer is correct,
the setup provides the user with a powerful way to poke holes in any suggested answer, and reward can be
dispensed without waiting to see the actual result.
The debate setup is shown in Figure 11, where Q represents the user’s question, Aki the ith statement by
7
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system k ∈ {1, 2}. Reward Rk is given to system k depending on the user’s judgment J .
Q
A11
A21
A12
A22
J
R1
R2
Figure 11 | Debate. Red decision and utility nodes belong to QA system 1, and green ones belong to QA
system 2.
3.5. Supervised IDA
Iterated distillation and amplification (IDA) [Christiano et al., 2018] is another suggestion that can be used for
training QA-systems to correctly answer questions where it is hard for an unaided user to directly determine
their correctness. Given an original question Q that is hard to answer correctly, less powerful systems Xk are
asked to answer a set of simpler questions Qi. By combining the answers Ai to the simpler questions Qi, the
user can guess the answer Aˆ to Q. A more powerful system Xk+1 is trained to answer Q, with Aˆ used as an
approximation of the correct answer to Q.
Once the more powerful system Xk+1 has been trained, the process can be repeated. Now an even more
powerful QA-system Xk+2 can be trained, by using Xk+1 to answer simpler questions to provide approximate
answers for training Xk+2. Systems may also be trained to find good subquestions, and for aggregating
answers to subquestions into answer approximations. In addition to supervised learning, IDA can also be
applied to reinforcement learning.
Q
Q1 A1
Q2 A2
Aˆ
A R
Figure 12 | Supervised IDA
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3.6. Comprehensive AI Services
Drexler [2019] argues that the main safety concern from artificial intelligence does not come from a single
agent, but rather from big collections of AI services. For example, one service may provide a world model,
another provide planning ability, a third decision making, and so on. As an aggregate, these services can be
very competent, even though each service only has access to a limited amount of resources and only optimizes
a short-term goal.
A simple model of Drexler’s comprehensive AI services (CAIS) is shown in Figure 13, where the output
of one service can be used as input to another. The general CAIS framework also allows services that develop
and train other services.
Input A1
R1
R2
A2
R3
A3
R4
A4
Output
Figure 13 | Comprehensive AI Services. The decision and utility nodes of each service is shown with a
different colour and variable superscript.
4. Discussion
Causal influence diagrams of frameworks provide a useful perspective for understanding AGI safety problems
and solutions, but there are some subtleties to be explored in their use and interpretation. In this section we
discuss some of these issues. First, we look at CIDs’ focus on agents and potential problems with this view.
Then we discuss the use and interpretation of CIDs, and the flexibility and design choices one has when
modeling frameworks.
4.1. Intentional Stance
Causal influence diagram representations are inherently agent-centric. Their key assumption is that one or
more intelligent systems are making decisions in a causal environment in order to maximize the sum of some
real-valued variables. This is an important perspective for AGI safety, as increasingly powerful optimization
processes are a core component of most AI and machine learning methods, and many AGI safety problems are
consequences of such optimization processes becoming too powerful in some sense. The agent perspective is
especially relevant for RL, perhaps the most promising method for constructing AGI.
A CID models an agent that “knows” the framework it is facing. Either it has been designed for that
framework (Q-learning has been designed to interact with an MDP), or it has been pre-trained for the
framework (e.g. by meta-learning [Wang et al., 2017]). The agent’s utility is a kind of fiction, as is easy to see
when all learning is offline: at deployment, the policy parameters are frozen and the agent executes a fixed
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pre-trained policy without receiving reward signals. However, the agent still acts as if it optimizes the reward
function it had during training, which means that the incentives arising from this fictional reward can still be
used to predict actual agent behaviour.
We adopt the intentional stance [Dennett, 1987; Orseau et al., 2018] towards the agent, which means
that it is not important whether the agent’s utility has an obvious physical correlate (e.g., the value of some
machine register, which may apply to an RL agent learning an MDP online). What counts is that treating the
system as an agent optimizing the reward is a good model for predicting its behaviour. We take this stance
because present-day systems already admit it, and because we think it will be increasingly admissible for
more advanced artificial agents.
Of course, the intentional stance is not always the most useful perspective for AGI safety questions. For
example, concerns about bounded rationality or adversarial inputs to an imperfect system do not show up
prominently when we analyze the incentives of a rational agent in some framework. It can also be tricky
to model the evolution of a system that is initially agent-like, but through self-modifications or accidental
breakage turns into something less goal-directed. Finally, some safety frameworks include insights that are
not fully captured by the agent-centric view: the CAIS framework can be seen as a collection of agents, but
the overall system does not naturally fit into this view.
4.2. Modeling Choices
Just like a causal graph [Pearl, 2009], a CID implies many causal relationships and conditional independencies
between nodes. A model is only accurate if it gets those relationships right. Generally, there should be a
directed path between a node X and a node Y if and only if an exogenous intervention changing the outcome
of X could affect the outcome of Y . Similarly, if two nodes X and Y are conditionally dependent when
conditioning on a third set Z of nodes, then X and Y should not be d-separated in the graph when conditioning
on Z [Pearl, 2009].
These requirements already put heavy constraints on what can be seen as an accurate CID of a given
framework. However, some choices are usually still left to the modeler. Most notably, freedom remains in
whether to aggregate or split random variables. For example, in the MDP in Figure 1, a single node represents
the state, while the MDP with a modifiable reward function in Figure 4 can be seen as an MDP where state
is represented by two nodes Si and ΘRi . The MDP diagram is more coarse-grained and the MDP with a
modifiable reward function is more fine-grained. In general, there is a trade-off between representing many
details and highlighting the big picture [Hoel et al., 2013].
Another choice is which random variables should be represented at all. For example, in reward modeling
in Figure 6, an extra node could have been added for the reward model itself. However, we left this out to
keep the diagram simple. From a probability theory perspective, we can think of the variable representing the
reward model having been marginalized out. It is not always possible to marginalize out nodes. For example,
it is not possible to marginalize out ΘH in reward modeling (Figure 6), because ΘH is necessary for there to
be a non-causal correlation between the feedback data nodes.
Two safety frameworks, reward modeling and IDA, include a recursive aspect that is intended to help
them scale to settings where feedback data is not easily produced by unaided humans. When modeling these
frameworks, we could take the intentional stance towards previous iterations of the recursive setup, resulting
in a multi-agent CID. We found that this seemed to make the diagram complicated without adding much
insight, since the execution of recursively trained agents can be considered an implementation detail. Still,
this shows that there can be choice about which aspects of a framework to model using the intentional stance.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have modeled many of the most prominent AGI safety frameworks with causal influence
diagrams. The unified representation allows us to pinpoint key similarities and differences. For example, a
key difference between CIRL and reward modeling is the causal relationship between the agent’s reward and
the user’s preferences. In CIRL, the reward follows directly from the user’s preferences, whereas in reward
modeling the path from user preferences to rewards is mediated by the feedback data.
Many of the important aspects for AGI safety are about causal relationships, and agents’ decisions to
influence their environment according to the objectives they are given. This is exactly what causal influence
diagrams describe, and what makes causal influence diagrams well suited to representing and comparing
different safety frameworks. For example, a well-known problem with prediction systems is that they
incentivize self-fulfilling prophecies. This is neatly represented with a causal path from the system’s answer
to the world state to the system’s reward. We could also see how various variants avoided the problem of
self-fulfilling prophecies. Both Tool AI and Counterfactual Oracles break the problematic causal path. We
expect future studies of AGI safety frameworks with causal influence diagrams to reveal further problems and
suggest possible solutions.
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